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Abstract
Support for radical right parties has grown rapidly in many Western countries over the past few decades.
In recent years, many studies have addressed the relationship between the presence of ethnic minorities
in people’s living environment and their support for a radical right party, but consensus is hard to find as
to how ethnic minority density is related to support for the radical right, let alone why. In this contribution,
we demonstrate that in The Netherlands, ethnic minority density is positively related to the likelihood to
vote for the Party for Freedom. This is particularly the case when the size of the minority group exceeds 15
per cent of the total neighbourhood population. We could establish this relationship by using the Dutch
1Vandaag Opinion Panel data set, a unique large-scale, individual-level data set comprising 21,200 native
Dutch respondents living in 3,068 different neighbourhoods. We enriched this data set with contextual in-
formation derived from Statistics Netherlands. The reason why ethnic minority density is linked to support
for the radical right is that these residents see non-Western migrants as a threat for their neighbourhood.
This is particularly true for residents who do not mingle with their non-coethnic neighbours.
Introduction
Support for radical right parties has grown rapidly in
many Western countries over the past few decades.
Although defining the radical right is not easy, radical
right parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenopho-
bia and anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2007).
In the wake of their growing popularity, scholarly at-
tempts to explain their success have likewise increased
in number (Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). Many stud-
ies have addressed the relationship between ethnic mi-
nority density and the likelihood of voting for a radical
right party (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Coffe´ et al.,
2007; Rink et al., 2009; Rydgren and Ruth, 2011), but
there is still no consensus as to how the ethnic compos-
ition of people’s living environment is related to support
for the radical right, let alone why.
In The Netherlands, the most important radical right
party is the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom;
PVV). The PVV was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders,
and in a recent expert survey, it has been indicated as a
radical right party, similar to, e.g., Vlaams Belang in
Belgium or Front National in France (Immerzeel et al.,
2011). The PVV ‘[. . .] has been particularly vocal in [. . .]
resorting to racist and xenophobic discourse, targeting
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above all Muslim communities’ (European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI], 2008: p. 35). The
PVV attracted 15 and 10 per cent of the votes in the past
two general elections (2010 and 2012, respectively).
Previous studies investigating the impact of the eth-
nic composition of people’s living environment on sup-
port for the radical right can be grouped into macro-
and micro-level studies. Macro-level studies relate the
ethnic composition of, for instance, voting districts,
municipalities, or countries to the mean support for the
radical right within this context (Knigge, 1998; Golder,
2003; Coffe´ et al., 2007; Bowyer, 2008; Biggs and
Knauss, 2012; Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Van der Waal
et al., 2013; Valdez, 2014; Van Gent et al., 2014). A
major advantage of macro-level studies is that they use
actual election results. The downside of this approach is
the risk of ecological fallacies (see also Rydgren, 2007).
When using election results, it is difficult to determine
the percentage of radical right voters among the native
population in each macro-level unit. This is because
both party preferences and turnout rates differ between
ethnic groups to an unknown degree, and these differ-
ences may even be district-specific. Micro-level studies
explain individual voting intentions or self-reported past
voting behaviour and enrich survey data with character-
istics of often relatively large geographic areas, such as
countries, regions/districts, or municipalities (Lubbers
and Scheepers, 2002; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005;
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Rink et al., 2009; Ford
and Goodwin, 2010; Werts et al., 2012; Green et al.,
2015; Stockemer, 2015). The impact of the ethnic com-
position of small-scale neighbourhoods has received
only scarce attention in micro-level studies [but see for
an exception, Dinas and Van Spanje (2011)].
Given the variety of research designs (i.e. macro-level
versus micro-level), the geographical areas covered (e.g.
voting districts, municipalities, or countries), and meas-
ures of radical right voting (i.e. intentions or behaviour),
it might not come as a surprise that findings with respect
to the impact of an environment’s ethnic composition
are mixed. Some studies have found a positive relation-
ship between ethnic minority density and radical right
voting (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Coffe´ et al., 2007;
Valdez, 2014); others have found no significant relation-
ship (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Stockemer, 2015) or
even a negative relationship (Bowyer, 2008; Rydgren
and Ruth, 2013). Further, although some studies have
found evidence for the idea that it is an increase in the
percentage of ethnic minorities in particular that drives
people to vote for radical right parties (Lubbers and
Scheepers, 2000; Kessler and Freeman, 2005),
others have not (Lubbers et al., 2000; Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006). Finally, some scholars have pointed to a
non-linear nature of the relationship between minority
group size and radical right voting (Rink et al., 2009;
Biggs and Knauss, 2012).
Success has also been limited when it comes to ex-
plaining the observed relationship between the presence
of ethnic minorities and support for the radical right.
The most important drawback of studies that rely solely
on macro-level data—besides the absence of a valid de-
pendent variable—is that they are not able to test the
underlying micro-level, demand-side, explanations.
Micro-level studies have focused on explanations
derived from conflict theory (Coser, 1956; Blalock,
1967; Olzak, 1992). The idea is that a higher, or increas-
ing, percentage of ethnic minorities in people’s living en-
vironment fuels perceptions of ethnic threat. Because
grievances arising from immigration and feelings of eth-
nic threat are considered to be the central attitudinal
drivers of the success of radical right parties (Rydgren,
2007; Ivarsflaten, 2008), this would explain a presumed
positive relation between ethnic minority density and
support for the radical right.
However, based on Blau’s (1977) opportunity struc-
ture theory, combined with contact theory (Allport,
1954/1979), an opposite expectation can be derived.
According to this line of reasoning, an increase in contact
opportunity leads to an increase in interethnic contact
(Blau, 1977; Martinovic, 2013), which, in turn, fosters
tolerance (Allport, 1954/1979; Pettigrew and Tropp,
2011). In theory, this would render people less likely to
vote for a radical right party. This would explain a nega-
tive relation between ethnic minority density and support
for the radical right, or at the least suppress a positive re-
lationship between the two. Remarkably, the indirect ef-
fect of minority group size on radical right voting via
interethnic contact has hardly been addressed empirically.
Only very recently, Green et al. (2015) considered the in-
fluence of interethnic contact on voting for the radical
right in Switzerland. Although living in Swiss regions
with a larger minority group did not induce interethnic
contact, they showed that interethnic contact is negatively
related with ethnic threat perceptions and the likelihood
to vote for the Swiss People’s Party.
Interethnic contact may not only affect radical right
support by reducing perceptions of threat but also mod-
erate the processes linking ethnic minority density with
right-wing voting. For people who have contact with
ethnic minority members, ethnic minority density may
not as readily translate itself into feelings of ethnic threat
(cf. McLaren, 2003) and consequently into a vote for
the radical right. Although there is evidence for such a
moderating influence for perceived ethnic threat, how
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contact moderates the relationship between ethnic mi-
nority density and support for the radical right has not
been tested.1
In this micro-level study, we will answer the ques-
tions as to how (increases in) minority group size within
neighbourhoods is related to support for the PVV among
native Dutch, and to what extent the observed relation-
ship can be explained by perceptions of ethnic neigh-
bourhood threat and interethnic neighbourhood
contact. We will use recent and unique individual-level
data from the Dutch 1Vandaag Opinion Panel (1VOP,
2015) enriched with neighbourhood characteristics pro-
vided by Statistics Netherlands. 1VOP is a very large
sample; it consists of 21,200 native Dutch living in
3,068 different neighbourhoods. Whereas smaller repre-
sentative samples face the problem that ethnically di-
verse localities are sparse, and samples focusing on
individuals living in big cities contain relatively few
neighbourhoods without a substantial minority group
size, our sample includes an abundance of residents liv-
ing in all types of neighbourhoods.
We will build on earlier research in several ways.
First, we will consider the impact of the presence of eth-
nic minorities within neighbourhoods, in contrast to al-
most all previous micro-level studies that focused on
larger-scale geographic areas, such as districts (Green
et al., 2015) or countries (Werts et al., 2012). We as-
sume that residents are more aware of the ethnic com-
position of their immediate living environments,
meaning that local contexts are more important than
larger contexts when it comes to the influence of ethnic
minority density (see also Dinesen and Sønderskov,
2015). Moreover, focusing on neighbourhoods gives the
advantage of more variation in ethnic minority density
across macro-level units. This will make it possible for
rigorously investigating a possible non-linear relation-
ship between ethnic minority density and support for
the radical right. Second, we will not only assess the im-
pact of the existing size of the minority group within
neighbourhoods but also simultaneously investigate
whether recent increases in ethnic minority density are
related to more support for the PVV. Finally, building
on the recent work of Green et al. (2015), we will inves-
tigate the interplay between the contact and threat
mechanism taking place within the neighbourhood
when explaining the relationship between (increases in)
minority group size and support for the radical right.
Focusing on The Netherlands, we will show that for
people with more interethnic contact, the presence of
ethnic minorities is experienced less as a threat to the
neighbourhood and thereby less likely to lead to a vote
for the PVV.
Theories and Hypotheses
According to contact theory, positive interethnic contact
reduces outgroup derogation (Allport, 1954/1979;
Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). Allport (1954/1979)
stressed that this would only hold if contact takes place
under ‘optimal’ conditions of which equal group status;
common objectives; intergroup cooperation; and the
support of authorities, law, or custom are the best
known. The meta-study of Pettigrew and Tropp (2011)
convincingly showed that these four conditions are not
necessary for interethnic contact to reduce prejudice, but
that contact under these conditions will reduce prejudice
more strongly. The influence of interethnic contact can
be explained in terms of increased levels of knowledge,
empathy, and perspective taking and decreased levels of
intergroup anxiety.
A higher percentage of ethnic minorities in a given
environment increases the likelihood that its residents
will have a positive interethnic contact, which, in turn,
reduces negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities
(Wagner et al., 2006; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).
Scholars have repeatedly proposed that higher levels of
interethnic contact would also reduce people’s likeli-
hood to vote for a radical right party (Biggs and Knauss,
2012; Van der Waal et al., 2013), but only two studies
have put this relationship to an empirical test. Rydgren
(2008) solely addressed the direct influence of intereth-
nic contact on radical right voting in six West European
countries, finding only support for a negative influence
of contact in two countries. Green et al. (2015) tested
the mediating role of interethnic contact between ethnic
minority density and radical right voting in Switzerland.
Although their findings revealed a negative influence of
interethnic contact on radical right voting, minority
group size was unrelated with interethnic contact.
In this contribution, we address the role of neigh-
bourhood contact with stigmatized ethnic minority
groups in The Netherlands. Although Geert Wilders’
rhetoric includes the presumed negative consequences of
immigration from (Eastern) European countries such as
Poland, his main concern lies with Muslims (ECRI,
2008). In this study, we assess how contact with non-
Western minorities—the vast majority of which is
Muslim—in the neighbourhood affects support for the
radical right. Should the contact mechanism be the sole,
or most important, mechanism behind the impact of
1 However, see Biggs and Knauss’ (2012) macro-level
study in which segregation is used as a proxy for
interethnic contact.
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ethnic minority density on radical right support, we
would expect that:
(H1a) The percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities
in the neighbourhood is negatively related to support for
the PVV, because (H1b) the percentage of non-Western
ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood is positively
related to interethnic neighbourhood contact, and (H1c)
interethnic neighbourhood contact is negatively related
to support for the PVV.
While the presence of minorities fosters interethnic
contact, it may, at the same time, lead to feelings of eth-
nic threat. According to conflict theory (Coser, 1956;
Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992), a higher percentage of eth-
nic minorities within a given environment increases
competition between natives and ethnic minorities for
economic resources and cultural issues. Ethnic competi-
tion, actual or perceived, fuels feelings of ethnic threat.
Feelings of ethnic threat are, together with the anti-
immigrant attitudes that result from experiencing threat,
the main determinants of support for the radical right
(Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Werts et al., 2012). That
said, evidence for a (positive) relationship between eth-
nic minority density and ethnic threat is not convincing
at the local level (Semyonov et al., 2004; Savelkoul
et al., 2014; but see Green et al., 2015; Newman et al.,
2015). Olzak (1992) was one of the first authors to
stress that ethnic threat is more likely to be triggered by
recent substantial increases in the size of the minority
group than by stable levels of ethnic minority density, as
the latter influence might flatten out as people become
accustomed to the presence of ethnic minorities, or
move out. We argue that the absence of more corrobora-
tive evidence might also be owing to the fact that in pre-
vious studies, the local level of ethnic density has been
related to measures of threat at the national level, rather
than to threats specific to the locality under consider-
ation. Following the aforementioned line of reasoning,
we propose that:
(H2a) The percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities
in the neighbourhood—and increases thereof—are posi-
tively related to support for the PVV, because (H2b) the
percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities in the
neighbourhood—and increases thereof—are positively
related to ethnic neighbourhood threat, and (H2c) eth-
nic neighbourhood threat is positively related to support
for the PVV.
Interethnic contact and feelings of threat are nega-
tively related, although the causal order can be debated
(Savelkoul et al., 2011). Previous research has also
shown that negative consequences of ethnic minority
density on ethnic threat perceptions or trust are weaker
for people with interethnic contact experiences
(McLaren, 2003; Schneider, 2008; Stolle et al., 2008). A
higher percentage of ethnic minorities might foster per-
ceptions of ethnic threat, but if residents of ethnically
dense environments have interethnic contact, the nega-
tive impact of a larger minority group size may be miti-
gated. This would then also lead to a weaker
relationship between ethnic minority density and radical
right voting. While we will take into account the nega-
tive relationship between ethnic threat and interethnic
contact, our focus is on testing the following hypothesis:
(H3a) The positive relationship between the percentage
of non-Western ethnic minorities—and increases there-
of—and support for the PVV, is weaker for people who
have interethnic neighbourhood contact, because (H3b)
the positive relationship between the percentage of non-
Western ethnic minorities—and increases thereof—and
ethnic neighbourhood threat is weaker for people who
have interethnic neighbourhood contact.
Using macro-level data, Biggs and Knauss (2012)
found that the predicted probability for being a member
of the British National Party is higher in neighbour-
hoods in which the relative minority group size reaches
25 per cent than in neighbourhoods in which there are
no ethnic minorities. However, in neighbourhoods
where ethnic minorities form three-quarters of the popu-
lation, the probability falls strongly. Rink et al. (2009)
reached similar conclusions, using individual-level data
on voting behaviour during general elections in Belgium.
After an initial steep increase in the likelihood of voting
for the Vlaams Blok in Belgian municipalities with
higher percentages of ethnic minority members, with the
further growth of the relative minority group size (more
than 4.8 per cent), the likelihood of radical right voting
substantially decreases. In this study, we will rigorously
explore possible non-linear relationships between
(changes in) ethnic minority density and radical right
voting.
Data
This study uses individual-level data from the 1VOP.
Respondents sign up for this opinion panel voluntarily,
after which they are invited to participate in small web
surveys on a regular basis. Results of these opinion polls
are regularly used in national news items. All 1VOP
members were invited to participate in the web survey
designed for the current study by email in February
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2015, and 25,774 respondents—of whom 24,790 (96.2
per cent) were native Dutch—took up the invitation.2 In
our 1VOP sample, we found that men, older individuals,
and those with higher education were somewhat overre-
presented. Because of the uniquely large sample size,
however, we could survey a wide range of people within
the Dutch population: we conducted our analyses on
specific subsamples (e.g. men/women, young/old, or
lower/higher educated) to assess if, and to what extent,
the non-representativity of our sample created a bias.
This turned out not to be the case. This and other add-
itional analyses are available upon request.
The ‘neighbourhood’ identifier included in the 1VOP
is the four-digit part of the postal code. In The
Netherlands, complete postal codes are combinations of
four digits and two letters (e.g. 1011AB), resembling
small parts of a specific street. The median surface area
of our four-digit neighbourhoods is 5.3 km2 and they
are, on average, inhabited by 4,000 people. The re-
spondents included in the final sample reside in 76 per
cent of all the four-digit postal codes in The Netherlands
(3,068/4,044). As Statistics Netherlands does not offer
contextual information for these neighbourhoods dir-
ectly, we constructed neighbourhood characteristics on
the basis of grid data (0.01 km2 grid cells; Statistics
Netherlands, 2014a).
Support for the PVV
To examine populist radical right voting in The
Netherlands, we measured respondents’ intended voting
behaviour: ‘Which party would you vote for if parlia-
mentary elections were held today?’ The answer catego-
ries to this question consisted of the 11 largest political
parties represented in the Dutch Parliament and the op-
tion ‘Another party’. We removed from the analysis the
3,396 respondents (13.7 per cent) who answered ‘I don’t
know’ (11.5 per cent), ‘blank vote’ (0.6 per cent)’, ‘I’m
not allowed to vote’ (0.004 per cent), ‘I’m allowed to
vote, but I wouldn’t’ (1.1 per cent), and ‘No answer’
(0.5 per cent). We constructed a dichotomous variable
measuring the intention to vote for the PVV.
In total, 18.5 per cent of our respondents intend to
vote for the PVV if parliamentary elections would be
held. Compared with the last parliamentary election
held in 2012 in which 10.1 per cent voted for the PVV,
this percentage (18.5) is considerably high, but this will
be, at least in part, the result of our selection of native
Dutch respondents, the decision to exclude the ‘I don’t
know’ category from our analyses, and the increased
popularity of the PVV. Additional analyses in which we
analysed (self-reported) voting behaviour during the par-
liamentary elections of 2012 led to substantially similar
findings.
The Percentage of Non-Western Minorities
Following the definition of Statistics Netherlands, peo-
ple are considered to be non-Western immigrants when
at least one of their parents was born in a non-Western
country. About 12 per cent of the Dutch population are
considered to be of non-Western descent in 2014. The
largest non-Western minority groups in The
Netherlands are Moroccan (2.2 per cent), Turkish (2.4
per cent), and Surinamese and Antillean (2.9 per cent;
Statistics Netherlands, 2014b). The percentage of non-
Western minorities for the neighbourhoods in which our
respondents live ranges from 0 to 67.6 per cent; the
mean value is 9.8 per cent.
To create a thorough test of the extent to which mi-
nority group sizes, and changes to them, affect support
for the PVV, we included both the average percentage
between 2014 and 2011 and the difference in the per-
centage of non-Western minorities between these two
years in our explanatory model. To scrutinize a possible
curvilinear effect of the presence of non-Western minor-
ities, we used categorized versions of these group size
variables. We used the following categories for the per-
centage of non-Western minorities: [0,5]; h5,10];
h10,12.5]; h12.5,15]; h15,20]; h20,30]; h30, HI].3 In add-
ition, we used the following categories for the difference
measure: [LO,0]; h0,0.5]; h0.5,1]; h1,2]; h2,HI].
Although these changes might not seem substantial, the
period in which either the influx or outflow of minor-
ities took place spanned only three years.
Interethnic Neighbourhood Contact and Ethnic
Neighbourhood Threat
To reduce variations in individual perceptions of neigh-
bourhood contact and neighbourhood threat, we pro-
vided our respondents with the following definition:
‘The neighbourhood is understood to mean the living
environment that is reachable on foot in fifteen minutes
from your own house.’ This corresponds roughly to a
2 We only selected respondents whose parents were
Dutch or those who identified with The Netherlands
in case one parent was non-Dutch.
3 In preliminary analyses, we also used quartiles and
quintiles, which led to substantially similar results,
but the non-linear relationship between minority
group size and support for the radical right is best
demonstrated with the presented categorization.
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neighbourhood with a surface area of 4.5 km2 (i.e. an
area with a radius of 1.2 km).
We measured interethnic neighbourhood contact
with the following question: ‘How often do you have
personal contact in your neighbourhood with people of
non-Western descent? By personal contact, we mean
that you know the name of this person and occasionally
have a conversation with this person.’ Our contact
measure thus referred to a positive contact experience.
The answer categories for this item included: ‘Never’
(0); ‘About once a year’ (1); ‘Several times a year’ (2);
‘About once a month’ (3); ‘Several times a month’ (4);
‘Once or several times a week’ (5); ‘(Almost) every day’
(6); and ‘Not applicable (in my neighbourhood, there
are no people of non-Western descent)’ (7), which we
labelled as ‘No opportunity’. Ethnic neighbourhood
threat was measured with the item: ‘I sometimes worry
that my neighbourhood is deteriorating because of the
arrival of ethnic minorities.’ The answer categories
were: ‘Totally disagree’ (0); ‘Somewhat disagree’ (1);
‘Neither disagree nor agree’ (2); ‘Somewhat agree’ (3);
‘Totally agree’ (4); and ‘I don’t know/no opinion’ (5). In
our main analyses, which explain voting for the PVV,
the categories of these variables were entered as separate
dummies, to be able to detect possible non-linear
relationships.
Control Variables
We included respondents’ gender, age, and level of edu-
cation. Moreover, we controlled for household compos-
ition, differentiating the following five categories:
‘Single, no kids’; ‘Single, kids’; ‘Married, no kids’;
‘Married, kids’; and ‘Student or living communally/
Living with parents/Other’. We included main daily ac-
tivity in the following categories: ‘Employee/Self-em-
ployed’; ‘Looking for work’; ‘Unable to work’;
‘Student’; ‘Housewife/house-husband’; ‘Pensioner’;
and ‘Other’. For all categorical control variables, we
used deviation coding, meaning that all coefficients
show deviations from the overall mean. At the neigh-
bourhood level, we controlled for affluence and neigh-
bourhood decline, using information on the average
house price in each neighbourhood (in e1,000), avail-
able for 2011 and 2012. We included the natural loga-
rithm of the average and that of the absolute difference
between both years.
Working Sample and Methods
We removed 194 respondents (less than 1 per cent) from
our sample for whom we could not match contextual in-
formation. This left us with 21,200 respondents in
3,068 neighbourhoods. The descriptive statistics for our
main variables can be found in Table 1.4 Because our re-
spondents are nested in neighbourhoods, we used multi-
level logistic regression analyses.
Results
Our individual-level control variables are similarly
related with radical right voting as found in previous re-
search (Lubbers et al., 2002; Rink et al., 2009; Lucassen
and Lubbers, 2012); for example, women, older individ-
uals, and those with higher education are less likely to
vote for the PVV (Table 2). The economic status of the
neighbourhood is not significantly related to support for
the PVV.5
People living in neighbourhoods with a higher per-
centage of non-Western minorities are more likely to
vote for the PVV (Table 2, Model 1); but only in neigh-
bourhoods where the relative minority group size ex-
ceeds 15 per cent do parameter estimates reach
significance. In neighbourhoods with between 15 and 20
per cent non-Western ethnic minorities, the odds of vot-
ing for the PVV are 1.23 higher than in neighbourhoods
with 5 per cent or fewer non-Western minorities
(b¼ 0.21, se¼ 0.08; exp(b) ¼ 1.23). The likelihood of
voting for the PVV seems to flatten when neighbour-
hoods become ethnically more dense; in neighbourhoods
in which non-Western minorities comprise more than 30
per cent of the total population, the odds of voting for
the PVV are 1.39 (b¼ 0.33, se¼ 0.10; exp(b) ¼ 1.39)
higher than in neighbourhoods with 5 per cent or fewer
non-Western minorities. Respondents living in neigh-
bourhoods facing either a stable or a decreasing minor-
ity group size are somewhat less likely to vote for the
PVV (b ¼ 0.14, se¼ 0.05; exp(b) ¼ 0.87) compared
with those living in neighbourhoods with a small in-
crease (<0.5). So far, our results seem to be in line with
conflict theory (H2), while being at odds with expect-
ations derived from contact theory (H1).
In Model 2 of Table 2, we introduce our interethnic
neighbourhood contact variable. For residents with
opportunities for interethnic contact, contact is
4 The descriptives of our individual-level control vari-
ables will not be publicly disclosed at the request of
the owners of the 1VOP panel but have been sent to
the editor and reviewers before publication.
5 The economic status of the neighbourhood is nega-
tively and significantly related to support for the rad-
ical right as long as we do not control for
neighbourhood composition effects.
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negatively related with the probability of voting for the
PVV, as we expected based on the contact theory (H1c).
When people meet non-Western minorities once a
month, the likelihood of voting for the PVV is lowest
(b ¼ 0.73, se¼ 0.08; exp(b) ¼ 0.48).6 When contact is
more frequent, the chance that residents will vote for the
PVV increases again. This might indicate that people
with more positive interethnic neighbourhood contact
might likewise have more negative interethnic contact
experiences. Respondents who claim to have no oppor-
tunity for interethnic contact are least likely to vote for
the PVV (b ¼ 0.92, se¼ 0.10; exp(b) ¼ 0.40).
Including the contact variable does not substantially
alter the estimates of (increases in) minority group size
and radical right voting, and interethnic neighbourhood
contact does not suppress an even stronger positive rela-
tionship between minority group size and support for
the PVV. Thus, even though residents of neighbour-
hoods with a higher percentage of non-Western minor-
ities have more interethnic neighbourhood contact
(Appendix 1, column 1), we refute H1.
Natives who experience higher levels of ethnic neigh-
bourhood threat are more likely to vote for the PVV
(Table 2, Model 3): compared with residents who do
not experience any ethnic threat (i.e. ‘Totally disagree’),
the odds of residents who do experience ethnic threat
are 81 times higher (b¼ 4.40, se¼0.13; exp(b) ¼ 81).
Perceptions of ethnic neighbourhood threat explain the
positive influence of the percentage of non-Western
minorities and changes to it on radical right voting vot-
ing: in Model 3, the impact of minority group size on
voting for the PVV is no longer positive; the impact is
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (Nindividual¼ 21,200; Nneighbourhood¼ 3,068)
Mean/Prop SD Minimum Maximum
% Non-Western minorities ([0–5]) 0.42 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h5,10]) 0.27 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h10,12.5]) 0.06 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h12.5,15]) 0.06 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h15,20]) 0.08 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h20,30]) 0.06 0 1
% Non-Western minorities (h30, HI]) 0.05 0 1
D % Non-Western minorities ([LO,0]) 0.26 0 1
D % Non-Western minorities (h0,0.5]) 0.36 0 1
D % Non-Western minorities (h0.5,1]) 0.22 0 1
D % Non-Western minorities (h1,2]) 0.12 0 1
D % Non-Western minorities (h2,HI]) 0.04 0 1
Economic affluence (housing value  1,000) 232.50 71.94 94.95 1,167
D Economic affluence (housing value  1,000) 5.69 5.44 74.80 69.75
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Never’) 0.24 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a year’) 0.07 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a year’) 0.16 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a month’) 0.09 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a month’) 0.15 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a week’) 0.15 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Almost every day’) 0.09 0 1
Contact non-Western minorities (‘No opportunity’) 0.06 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘Totally disagree’) 0.20 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat disagree’) 0.25 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘Neither disagree nor agree’) 0.20 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat agree’) 0.14 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘Totally agree’) 0.18 0 1
Ethnic threat (‘I don’t know/no opinion’) 0.03 0 1
Notes: Sample comprises native Dutch only. ‘% non-Western minorities’ refers to the mean score between 2011 and 2014. ‘D % non-Western minorities’ refers to
the difference between 2011 and 2014. ‘Economic affluence’ refers to the mean score between 2011 and 2012. ‘D Economic affluence’ refers to the difference between
2011 and 2012.
Sources: 1VOP (2015); Statistics Netherlands (2011, 2014).
6 The category ‘once a month’ deviates significantly
from ‘never’, ‘once a year’, ‘several times a week’,
and ‘almost every day’.
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Table 2. Cross-sectional models explaining voting for the PVV
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 1.62 (0.06)*** 1.20 (0.07)*** 3.68 (0.14)***
Contextual-level variables
% Non-Western minorities (REF: [0–5])
% Non-Western minorities (h5,10]) 0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.12 (0.06)*
% Non-Western minorities (h10,12.5]) 0.07 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 0.18 (0.10)
% Non-Western minorities (h12.5,15]) 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.22 (0.10)*
% Non-Western minorities (h15,20]) 0.21 (0.08)** 0.22 (0.08)** 0.26 (0.09)**
% Non-Western minorities (h20,30]) 0.29 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.09)*** 0.24 (0.10)*
% Non-Western minorities (h30, HI]) 0.33 (0.10)*** 0.32 (0.10)** 0.29 (0.11)*
D % Non-Western minorities (REF: h0,0.5])
D % Non-Western minorities (h0.5,1]) 0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.07 (0.06)
D % Non-Western minorities (h1,2]) 0.11 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07) 0.10 (0.08)
D % Non-Western minorities (h2,HI]) 0.04 (0.10) 0.02 (0.11) 0.00 (0.12)
D % Non-Western minorities ([LO,0]) 0.14 (0.05)** 0.14 (0.05)** 0.07 (0.06)
Log(Economic affluence) 0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 0.09 (0.09)
Log(D Economic affluence) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Individual-level variables
Contact non-Western minorities (REF: ‘Never’)
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a year’) 0.50 (0.08)*** 0.30 (0.09)**
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a year’) 0.66 (0.06)*** 0.45 (0.07)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a month’) 0.73 (0.08)*** 0.61 (0.09)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a month’) 0.59 (0.06)*** 0.35 (0.07)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a week’) 0.52 (0.06)*** 0.36 (0.07)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Almost every day’) 0.24 (0.07)*** 0.16 (0.08)*
Contact non-Western minorities (‘No opportunity’) 0.92 (0.10)*** 0.29 (0.11)**
Ethnic threat (REF: ‘Totally disagree’)
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat disagree’) 0.91 (0.14)***
Ethnic threat (‘Neither disagree nor agree’) 2.00 (0.14)***
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat agree’) 3.05 (0.13)***
Ethnic threat (‘Totally agree’) 4.40 (0.13)***
Ethnic threat (‘I don’t know/no opinion’) 2.49 (0.16)***
Gender (female) 0.32 (0.02)*** 0.31 (0.02)*** 0.13 (0.03)***
Gender (male) 0.32 (0.02)*** 0.31 (0.02)*** 0.13 (0.03)***
Education (in years/10) 1.64 (0.06)*** 1.60 (0.06)*** 0.94 (0.07)***
Age (in years/10) 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.03)***
Household (single, no kids) 0.24 (0.04)*** 0.25 (0.04)*** 0.22 (0.05)***
Household (single, kids) 0.28 (0.08)*** 0.29 (0.08)*** 0.36 (0.10)***
Household (married, no kids) 0.18 (0.04)*** 0.18 (0.04)*** 0.17 (0.05)***
Household (married, kids) 0.08 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06)
Household (other) 0.05 (0.09) 0.05 (0.09) 0.02 (0.11)
Daily activity (working) 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.03 (0.06)
Daily activity (looking for work) 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.22 (0.10)*
Daily activity (unable to work) 0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.07) 0.03 (0.08)
Daily activity (student) 0.55 (0.21)** 0.56 (0.21)** 0.64 (0.24)**
Daily activity (housewife/husband) 0.35 (0.10)*** 0.36 (0.10)*** 0.33 (0.11)**
Daily activity (retired) 0.09 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07)
Daily activity (other) 0.27 (0.09)** 0.28 (0.09)** 0.14 (0.10)
Variance component
Neighbourhoods 0.05 0.05 0.05
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.13 0.45
AIC 19,146 18,912 14,270
BIC 19,361 19,183 14,580
Notes: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; and ***P<0.001 (two-tailed test). Nindividual¼21,200; Nneighbourhood¼3,068. The sample comprises native Dutch only. The control variables
‘gender’, ‘household composition’, and ‘daily activity’ are included as deviation contrasts. The control variables ‘age’, ‘education’, ‘economic affluence’, and ‘D economic af-
fluence’ are grand mean centred. The varianceneighbourhoods of the empty model is 0.10. The individual-level variance is fixed (p
2/3) because we use the logit link function.
Sources: 1VOP (2015); Statistics Netherlands (2011, 2014).
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even negative and significant. Increasing minority group
size is no longer significantly related with voting for the
PVV once we take into account ethnic neighbourhood
threat. Combined with the finding that living in neigh-
bourhoods with a larger non-Western minority popula-
tion is related to greater ethnic neighbourhood threat
and the level of threat is lower in neighbourhoods with a
decreasing or stable minority population, as compared
with neighbourhoods with a small increase (<0.5;
Appendix 1, column 2), we thereby find clear support
for H2 derived from the conflict theory.
In line with previous studies (Schlueter and Scheepers,
2010; Savelkoul et al., 2011), we observe a negative rela-
tion between contact and threat (Appendix 1). However,
we expected that interethnic contact would also mitigate
the positive influence of ethnic minority density (and
changes thereof) on radical right voting, because the
(increasing) minority group size would be weaker related
to feelings of ethnic threat for residents who have inter-
ethnic contact on a regular basis than for residents with
no or irregular interethnic contact. The positive relation-
ship between minority group size and interethnic neigh-
bourhood threat is significantly less pronounced for
people who regularly mingle with non-Western ethnic
minorities as expected (Appendix 2). Further support for
H3 can be found in Figure 1 (see also Appendix 3). In the
left panel of Figure 1, we show that for residents who
have no interethnic neighbourhood contact (or only on an
irregular basis), ethnic minority density is more strongly
related to support for the PVV than for residents with
regular interethnic contact; the slope of the redline (with
dots) is steeper than that of the blue line (with triangles).
Once we control for levels of neighbourhood threat (right
panel, Figure 1), the impact of ethnic minority density is
very similar across residents with and without contact.
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable
and the resulting interpretation problems with inter-
actions (Ai and Norton, 2003), we refrain from formally
testing the significance of the interaction effect of ethnic
minority density with contact. Although we should thus
be cautious in drawing bold conclusions, our results are
in line with both H3a and H3b.
In contrast to our expectation, interethnic neighbour-
hood contact moderates the impact of changes in minor-
ity group size on neither threat nor radical right voting
(Appendix 2 and 3). Possibly because effects of changes
in ethnic minority density were not very substantial to
begin with.
Figure 1. Probability to vote for the PVV for residents with different levels of interethnic contact. Notes: Predicted probabilities (and
the uncertainties therein; 90% CI) are based on estimates of fixed effects only. X-axis labels refer to the mean value within each cat-
egory of the ‘% non-Western ethnic minorities’ variable. ‘No or irregular contact’ is defined as at most ‘several times a year’ (re-
spondents with no opportunity for contact are not included). ‘Regular contact’ is defined as at least ‘about once a month’. We
controlled for same set of variables as reported in Table 2. The sample comprises native Dutch only.
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Discussion
Anti-immigrant sentiments are the most important de-
terminants of support for the radical right. These feel-
ings are triggered by continuous migration flows and by
the subsequent (perceived) threat of migrants to ‘our
way of life’. Several authors have shown a positive rela-
tion between (increases in) ethnic minority density at the
country or regional level and support for the radical
right (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000,
2002; Lubbers et al., 2002; Kessler and Freeman, 2005).
More recently, attention has shifted to the impact of eth-
nic minority group sizes at the very local level (e.g.
neighbourhoods or voting districts) on support for the
radical right. However, so far, empirical evidence has
been based largely on macro-level studies (Biggs and
Knauss, 2012; Rydgren and Ruth, 2013; Valdez, 2014;
but see also Dinas and Van Spanje, 2011), probably
owing to the lack of large-scale, individual-level data
sets. This has consequences not only for the interpret-
ation of the findings (as the votes of ethnic minorities
are also included in election results) but also for the pos-
sibility to unravel underlying explanations.
In this contribution, we have shown that in The
Netherlands, both the existing proportion of non-
Western ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods and, to a
lesser extent, recent increases thereof are positively
related to the likelihood of voting for the PVV. The rela-
tionship between ethnic minority density and the odds
to vote for the PVV proved to be non-linear; the odds in-
crease rapidly once the group size exceeds 15 per cent
and seems to flatten in ethnically highly dense neigh-
bourhoods (with more than 30 per cent minorities). We
could establish this non-linear relationship because we
relied on a unique large-scale, individual-level data set
enriched with relevant information about neighbour-
hoods that varied widely in ethnic composition. Not
only could we establish a positive link between ethnic
minority density and support for the radical right, we
showed that this relation can be explained by the fact
that in particular, residents of ethnically more dense
neighbourhoods are of the opinion that the presence of
ethnic minorities leads to neighbourhood deterioration.
In neighbourhoods with a larger proportion of non-
Western minorities, native Dutch have more positive
contact experiences with this ethnic group. We expected
that interethnic contact would make residents less likely
to vote for the PVV, but we found only weak support
for a direct impact of interethnic contact (cf. Rydgren,
2008). Although interethnic contact is negatively and
significantly related with the odds of voting for the PVV,
its impact is not substantial. This is not to say that
interethnic neighbourhood contact is irrelevant. Unlike
commonly used indicators of interethnic contact, our
contact measure enabled us to differentiate between re-
spondents lacking the possibility to interact with non-
Western minorities in their neighbourhood and those
without interethnic neighbourhood contact, while hav-
ing the opportunity to interact. Predominantly, the latter
group perceives ethnic minorities as a threat to their
neighbourhood and is more likely to vote for the PVV.
Our findings also illustrate that interethnic contact mod-
erates the process by which ethnic minority density leads
to support for the radical right: only for residents who
seldom interact with their non-Western neighbours, the
size of the minority group is related to more support for
the PVV, because for these residents in particular, a
larger minority group in the neighbourhood induces
feelings of ethnic neighbourhood threat.
Together with Green et al. (2015), we were the first
to simultaneously test the mediating role of ethnic threat
perceptions and interethnic contact, explaining influ-
ences of ethnic minority density on radical right voting.
Surprisingly, once we take into account the role of
neighbourhood contact and threat, residents of neigh-
bourhoods with more than 5 per cent ethnic minorities
are less likely to support the PVV than those of neigh-
bourhoods with up to 5 per cent minorities. This is a
puzzling finding that warrants further research.
Given that we had to rely on cross-sectional data, we
had to be cautious in making very strong causal inter-
pretations. Selective residential mobility may be part of
the reason why we observe a (positive) relationship be-
tween ethnic minority density and interethnic neigh-
bourhood contact. At the same time, it is likely to
suppress the positive relationship between ethnic minor-
ity density and perceived ethnic threat. Future research
could further test whether the influences of (increasing)
ethnic minority density and both mediators can be gen-
eralized to other Western countries and preferably test
these influences using longitudinal data.
Neither Rydgren (2008) nor we found very convinc-
ing evidence for a direct influence of interethnic contact
on radical right voting. However, we should not dismiss
the contact mechanism too hastily. Our measure of
interethnic contact referred to positive contact with stig-
matized minority groups taking place in the neighbour-
hood. We neither captured interethnic friendships
within the neighbourhood nor assessed the impact of
positive and negative interethnic contact experiences
that take place outside the direct residential neighbour-
hood. However, contact taking place outside the neigh-
bourhood will not explain the impact of ethnic minority
density of the neighbourhood on support for the radical
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right, which was the focus of this contribution. Future
research could further investigate how interethnic con-
tact in different domains and with different minority
groups (e.g. with immigrants from Eastern Europe) af-
fect support for the radical right and how these types of
contacts moderate the relationship between ethnic mi-
nority density and support for radical right parties.
Summarizing, we found that residents of ethnically
dense neighbourhoods are more likely to vote for the
PVV. Using a unique large-scale, individual-level data
set enriched with information about people’s direct liv-
ing environments, we could detect that only when the
proportion of non-Western minorities reaches a substan-
tial size (in our study, a tipping point of 15 per cent)
does this relationship become apparent. The reason why
residents of ethnically dense neighbourhoods are more
attracted to the rhetoric of the radical right is because
they see non-Western migrants as a threat to their neigh-
bourhood. This is particularly true for residents who do
not mingle with their non-coethnic neighbours.
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Appendix
Table A1. Cross-sectional models explaining interethnic contact and ethnic threat
Interethnic contact Ethnic threat
(Intercept) 2.27 (0.05)*** 1.88 (0.03)***
Contextual-level variables
% Non-Western minorities (REF: [0–5])
% Non-Western minorities (h5,10]) 0.60 (0.04)*** 0.18 (0.02)***
% Non-Western minorities (h10,12.5]) 0.77 (0.07)*** 0.28 (0.04)***
% Non-Western minorities (h12.5,15]) 0.96 (0.07)*** 0.33 (0.04)***
% Non-Western minorities (h15,20]) 0.99 (0.06)*** 0.46 (0.04)***
% Non-Western minorities (h20,30]) 1.43 (0.07)*** 0.54 (0.05)***
% Non-Western minorities (h30, HI]) 1.78 (0.08)*** 0.62 (0.05)***
D % Non-Western minorities (REF: h0,0.5])
D % Non-Western minorities (h0.5,1]) 0.05 (0.04) 0.00 (0.03)
D % Non-Western minorities (h1,2]) 0.08 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03)
D % Non-Western minorities (h2,HI]) 0.15 (0.09) 0.04 (0.05)
D % Non-Western minorities ([LO,0]) 0.04 (0.04) 0.08 (0.03)***
Log(Economic affluence) 0.02 (0.06) 0.02 (0.04)
Log(D Economic affluence) 0.03 (0.01)* 0.00 (0.01)
Individual-level variables
Ethnic threat (REF: ‘Totally disagree’)
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat disagree’) 0.15 (0.04)***
Ethnic threat (‘Neither disagree nor agree’) 0.22 (0.04)***
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat agree’) 0.08 (0.05)
Ethnic threat (‘Totally agree’) 0.29 (0.05)***
Ethnic threat (‘I don’t know/no opinion’) 1.09 (0.08)***
Contact non-Western minorities (REF: ‘Never’)
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a year’) 0.21 (0.04)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a year’) 0.26 (0.03)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Once a month’) 0.22 (0.04)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a month’) 0.29 (0.03)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Several times a week’) 0.23 (0.03)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘Almost every day’) 0.22 (0.04)***
Contact non-Western minorities (‘No opportunity’) 0.55 (0.04)***
Gender (female) 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.20 (0.01)***
Gender (male) 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.20 (0.01)***
Education (in years/10) 0.17 (0.04)*** 1.03 (0.03)***
Age (in years/10) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
Household (single, no kids) 0.02 (0.03) 0.08 (0.02)***
Household (single, kids) 0.14 (0.07)* 0.04 (0.04)
Household (married, no kids) 0.15 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.02)**
Household (married, kids) 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.07 (0.03)**
Household (other) 0.13 (0.07) 0.03 (0.04)
Daily activity (working) 0.08 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.02)***
Daily activity (looking for work) 0.09 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04)
Daily activity (unable to work) 0.12 (0.06)* 0.02 (0.04)
Daily activity (student) 0.02 (0.14) 0.10 (0.09)
Daily activity (house wife/husband) 0.18 (0.08)* 0.11 (0.05)*
Daily activity (retired) 0.15 (0.04)*** 0.02 (0.03)
Daily activity (other) 0.03 (0.07) 0.16 (0.05)
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Table A1. (Continued)
Interethnic contact Ethnic threat
Variance component
Neighbourhoods 0.09 0.03
Individuals 3.99 1.64
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.11
Notes: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; and ***P<0.001 (two-tailed test). Nindividual¼21,200; Nneighbourhood¼3,068. The sample comprises native Dutch only. When analysing
the relationship between minority group size and interethnic contact, we recoded the ‘No opportunity’ category as ‘Never’ (0) and treated the resulting contact vari-
able as continuous. When analysing the relationship between minority group size and ethnic threat, we recoded the ‘I don’t know/no opinion’ category as ‘Neither dis-
agree nor agree’ (2) and treated the resulting threat variable as continuous. Excluding these categories yields substantially similar findings. The control variables
‘gender’, ‘household composition’, and ‘daily activity’ are included as deviation contrasts. The control variables ‘age’, ‘education’, ‘economic affluence’, and
‘D economic affluence’ are grand mean centred. For interethnic contact, the variance components of the empty model are: varianceneighbourhoods¼0.38,
varianceindividuals¼4.09. For ethnic threat, the variance components of the empty model are: varianceneighbourhoods¼0.09 and varianceindividuals¼1.79.
Sources: 1VOP (2015); Statistics Netherlands (2011, 2014).
Table A2. Cross-sectional models explaining relation between minority group size (and changes thereof) and ethnic threat
for different levels of interethnic contact
Ethnic threat
(subsample: ‘No or
irregular contact’)
Ethnic threat
(subsample: ‘Regular
contact’)
Significance of
difference
(Intercept) 1.72 (0.04)*** 1.70 (0.04)***
Contextual-level variables
% Non-Western minorities (REF: [0–5])
% Non-Western minorities (h5,10]) 0.28 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.04) ***
% Non-Western minorities (h10,12.5]) 0.35 (0.06)*** 0.20 (0.06)***
% Non-Western minorities (h12.5,15]) 0.41 (0.07)*** 0.24 (0.06)*** *
% Non-Western minorities (h15,20]) 0.59 (0.06)*** 0.34 (0.05)*** **
% Non-Western minorities (h20,30]) 0.59 (0.07)*** 0.45 (0.06)***
% Non-Western minorities (h30, HI]) 0.89 (0.09)*** 0.46 (0.06)*** ***
D % Non-Western minorities (REF: h0,0.5])
D % Non-Western minorities (h0.5,1]) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
D % Non-Western minorities (h1,2]) 0.00 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)
D % Non-Western minorities (h2,HI]) 0.06 (0.09) 0.04 (0.07)
D % Non-Western minorities ([LO,0]) 0.04 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04)**
Log(Economic affluence) 0.03 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06)
Log(D Economic affluence) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Individual-level variables
Gender (female) 0.22 (0.02)*** 0.20 (0.02)***
Gender (male) 0.22 (0.02)*** 0.20 (0.02)***
Education (in years/10) 1.05 (0.04)*** 1.10 (0.04)***
Age (in years/10) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Household (single, no kids) 0.07 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.03)**
Household (single, kids) 0.08 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06)
Household (married, no kids) 0.07 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.03)*
Household (married, kids) 0.11 (0.04)** 0.03 (0.04)
Household (other) 0.05 (0.07) 0.11 (0.07)
Daily activity (working) 0.14 (0.04)*** 0.02 (0.03) *
Daily activity (looking for work) 0.01 (0.07) 0.07 (0.06)
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Table A2. (Continued)
Ethnic threat
(subsample: ‘No or
irregular contact’)
Ethnic threat
(subsample: ‘Regular
contact’)
Significance of
difference
Daily activity (unable to work) 0.00 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
Daily activity (student) 0.17 (0.14) 0.06 (0.13)
Daily activity (house wife/husband) 0.07 (0.07) 0.10 (0.08)
Daily activity (retired) 0.05 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
Daily activity (other) 0.26 (0.07)*** 0.08 (0.07)
Variance component
Neighbourhoods 0.04 0.03
Individuals 1.63 1.71
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.10
Notes: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; and ***P <0.001 (two-tailed test). The sample comprises native Dutch only. ‘No or irregular contact’ is defined as at most ‘several times a
year’ (respondents with no opportunity for contact are not included). ‘Regular contact’ is defined as at least ‘about once a month’. For subsample ‘No or irregular con-
tact’: Nindividuals¼9,722; Nneighbourhoods¼2,648. For subsample ‘Regular contact’: Nindividuals ¼10,160; Nneighbourhoods¼2401. When analysing the relationship be-
tween minority group size and ethnic threat, we recoded the ‘I don’t know/no opinion’ category as ‘Neither disagree nor agree’ (2) and treated the resulting ethnic
threat variable as continuous. Excluding this category yields substantially similar findings. The control variables ‘gender’, ‘household composition’, and ‘daily activity’
are included as deviation contrasts. The control variables ‘age’, ‘education’, ‘economic affluence’, and ‘D economic affluence’ are grand mean centred. For ethnic
threat (subsample: ‘No or irregular contact’), the variance components of the empty model are: varianceneighbourhoods¼0.11, varianceindividuals¼1.77. For ethnic threat
(subsample: ‘Regular contact’), the variance components of the empty model are: varianceneighbourhoods¼0.09, varianceindividuals¼1.83.
Sources: 1VOP (2015); Statistics Netherlands (2011, 2014).
Table A3. Cross-sectional models explaining relation between minority group size (and changes thereof) and voting for
the PVV for different levels of interethnic contact
PVV voting (subsample:
‘No or irregular contact’)
PVV voting (subsample:
‘Regular contact’)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(Intercept) 1.43 (0.08)*** 3.52 (0.19)*** 1.78 (0.09)*** 4.64 (0.25)***
Contextual-level variables
% Non-Western minorities (REF: [0–5])
% Non-Western minorities (h5,10]) 0.11 (0.07) 0.20 (0.08)** 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.09)
% Non-Western minorities (h10,12.5]) 0.20 (0.12) 0.14 (0.13) 0.02 (0.12) 0.18 (0.14)
% Non-Western minorities (h12.5,15]) 0.01 (0.13) 0.46 (0.14)** 0.22 (0.12) 0.05 (0.14)
% Non-Western minorities (h15,20]) 0.28 (0.11)* 0.32 (0.12)* 0.18 (0.11) 0.15 (0.13)
% Non-Western minorities (h20,30]) 0.41 (0.13)** 0.19 (0.15) 0.25 (0.12)* 0.21 (0.14)
% Non-Western minorities (h30, HI]) 0.59 (0.16)*** 0.28 (0.18) 0.28 (0.13)* 0.17 (0.15)
D % Non-Western minorities (REF: h0,0.5])
D % Non-Western minorities (h0.5,1]) 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 0.07 (0.09)
D % Non-Western minorities (h1,2]) 0.05 (0.09) 0.09 (0.11) 0.16 (0.09) 0.14 (0.11)
D % Non-Western minorities (h2,HI]) 0.17 (0.16) 0.09 (0.18) 0.01 (0.14) 0.02 (0.16)
D % Non-Western minorities ([LO,0]) 0.08 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) 0.17 (0.08)* 0.05 (0.09)
Log(Economic affluence) 0.05 (0.11) 0.11 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12) 0.09 (0.14)
Log(D Economic affluence) 0.04 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03)* 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
Individual-level variables
Ethnic threat (REF: ‘Totally disagree’)
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat disagree’) 0.77 (0.19)*** 1.15 (0.25)***
Ethnic threat (‘Neither disagree nor agree’) 1.85 (0.18)*** 2.30 (0.24)***
Ethnic threat (‘Somewhat agree’) 2.77 (0.18)*** 3.47 (0.23)***
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Table A3. (Continued)
PVV voting (subsample:
‘No or irregular contact’)
PVV voting (subsample:
‘Regular contact’)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Ethnic threat (‘Totally agree’) 4.14 (0.18)*** 4.88 (0.23)***
Ethnic threat (‘I don’t know/no opinion’) 2.29 (0.22)*** 3.17 (0.31)***
Gender (female) 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.07 (0.04) 0.37 (0.04)*** 0.21 (0.04)***
Gender (male) 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.07 (0.04) 0.37 (0.04)*** 0.21 (0.04)***
Education (in years/10) 1.67 (0.09)*** 1.03 (0.10)*** 1.62 (0.09)*** 0.86 (0.11)***
Age (in years/10) 0.08 (0.03)* 0.05 (0.04) 0.11 (0.03)** 0.11 (0.04)**
Household (single, no kids) 0.26 (0.07)*** 0.26 (0.08)*** 0.26 (0.06)*** 0.20 (0.08)**
Household (single, kids) 0.43 (0.12)*** 0.50 (0.15)*** 0.19 (0.12) 0.24 (0.14)
Household (married, no kids) 0.24 (0.06)*** 0.24 (0.07)*** 0.16 (0.06)** 0.13 (0.07)
Household (married, kids) 0.06 (0.07) 0.03 (0.09) 0.08 (0.07) 0.10 (0.09)
Household (other) 0.02 (0.13) 0.04 (0.15) 0.16 (0.13) 0.01 (0.16)
Daily activity (working) 0.08 (0.07) 0.07 (0.09) 0.02 (0.07) 0.00 (0.09)
Daily activity (looking for work) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.34 (0.15)* 0.04 (0.12) 0.20 (0.15)
Daily activity (unable to work) 0.03 (0.10) 0.02 (0.12) 0.03 (0.10) 0.04 (0.12)
Daily activity (student) 0.71 (0.31)* 0.73 (0.36)* 0.50 (0.29) 0.71 (0.34)*
Daily activity (housewife/husband) 0.28 (0.14)* 0.28 (0.16) 0.39 (0.15)* 0.37 (0.18)*
Daily activity (retired) 0.14 (0.09) 0.12 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 0.06 (0.10)
Daily activity (other) 0.41 (0.13)** 0.18 (0.15) 0.13 (0.14) 0.11 (0.16)
Variance component
Neighbourhoods 0.042 0.007 0.075 0.093
Model fit
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.49
AIC 9,310 7,135 8,896 6,493
BIC 9,503 7,365 9,091 6,724
Notes: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*P<0.05; **P<0.01; and ***P<0.001 (two-tailed test). The sample comprises native Dutch only. ‘No or irregular contact’ is defined as at most ‘several times a
year’ (respondents with no opportunity for contact are not included). ‘Regular contact’ is defined as at least ‘about once a month’. For subsample ‘No or irregular con-
tact’: Nindividuals¼9,722; Nneighbourhoods¼2,648. For subsample ‘Regular contact’: Nindividuals¼10,160; Nneighbourhoods¼2,401. The control variables ‘gender’, ‘house-
hold composition’, and ‘daily activity’ are included as deviation contrasts. The control variables ‘age’, ‘education’, ‘economic affluence’, and ‘D economic affluence’
are grand mean centred. For subsample ‘no or irregular contact’: the varianceneighbourhoods of the empty model is 0.04. For subsample ‘regular contact’: the vari-
anceneighbourhoods of the empty model is 0.08. The individual-level variance is fixed (p
2/3) because we use the logit link function.
Sources: 1VOP (2015); Statistics Netherlands (2011, 2014).
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